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Abstract: Currently, a substantial institutional change is under way for marine and coastal 
resources. Sustainability plays a major role therein. At the time of writing, roughly 2.3% of 
the marine and coastal territory has been declared a Marine Protected Area (MPA).  
The Convention of Biological Diversity set a target to protect 10% of the global marine 
environment by 2020. This move toward enclosure signifies a substantial shift away from 
mainly open access to at least de jure marine protected areas. What drives institutional 
change towards MPAs; and what role does sustainability play in this change in 
governance? In reflecting on these questions, the paper’s aim is to begin a dialogue on how 
the social-ecological system (SES) analytical framework developed by Elinor Ostrom and 
her collaborators engages differentially with marine and coastal systems. How institutional 
change takes place depends on the characteristics of the resources considered and the 
drivers of change for the particular resource. In order to characterize the marine and coastal 
realm we use the social-ecological system (SES) framework of Elinor Ostrom. Douglas 
North’s theory of institutional change is used to classify the change observed.  
The marine realm has ambiguous system boundaries and often high resource mobility. 
Uncertainties about system properties and change are much higher than for terrestrial 
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systems. Interdependencies among different ecosystems are high, necessitating multi-level 
governance. Institutional change in this sector occurs under strong institutional path 
dependencies and competing ideologies. All these features make it particularly relevant to 
think about institutional change, sustainability and the current process of MPA expansion.  




Marine governance is a relative latecomer as far as institution-building is concerned. This is 
observable for coastal areas, but definitely holds true for the open sea. Throughout human history the 
demand for regulatory institutions for the sea has been low compared to terrestrial areas. The reasons 
are manifold, including the long-perceived abundance of marine resources, and certain physical 
properties such as the absence of visible borders. Currently, one can observe a certain catch-up in 
institutional development within the marine and coastal realm. The pressures on the coast and on the 
sea have significantly increased in today’s crowded world. Many resources have become scarce; and 
people are increasingly aware of the ocean’s importance as an ecosystem service provider. Important 
goods and services from the sea range from fish and other marine species, to storm protection, carbon 
absorption, diving grounds, wind mill farming, transportation, mangrove habitat and biodiversity. 
Many of those services are becoming increasingly scarce, which leads a societal group to reflect on 
and demand institutional change. 
Institutional change is importantly influenced by the physical, ecological and social contexts in 
which it takes place. The following paper is written by a group of scientists who dedicate their 
scientific interest to social processes in relation to the coast and the sea, mainly in the tropical belt.  
The aim of this paper is to begin a dialogue about the ways institutional change differs for the marine 
and coastal realm; and what distinguishes it from other processes of institutional change. From this 
perspective it is a review and conceptual paper. There is a scientific discussion under way (raised 
elsewhere in this special issue) about specific ecosystem characteristics and the implications for 
institutional analysis [1]. Within the marine and coastal context, the contributions to such a conceptual 
analysis are very few [2,3]. The authors seek to contribute to this discussion about features of the 
marine and coastal realm and the linkages to institutional change and sustainability with a synthesis 
perspective. Rather than focus on one particular case study, we take a broad look at the relationships 
among social, ecological and institutional characteristics within the marine realm drawing on many 
different examples from our analyses around the tropical belt (i.e., Costa Rica, The Bahamas, Brazil, 
Indonesia, and others). Three further qualifications are necessary.  
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First, the marine and coastal realm is broad and diverse. The wide range of goods and services 
provided by the sea make it difficult to proclaim any general statements about the institutional change 
in relation to the sea. Institutional problems in the marine environment reach from the global issue of 
acidification, to the health of small coral reefs (where tourists want to dive and fishers want to fish), to 
remote Islands in the Pacific, where for example, indigenous populations work to adapt to climate 
change. We also recognize that coastal governance provides different regulation challenges than the 
open sea. The physical and social characteristics are very diverse; therefore it can be expected that the 
institutional solutions will also need to be very diverse. Solutions must be associated with different 
geographical levels and specific governance regimes. Some solutions may have more in common with 
certain land based resources than with other sea resources. However, there are shared features such as: 
boundary ambiguity, interconnectedness of ecosystems, enormous complexity and a high degree of 
uncertainty regarding many ecosystems. The different spatial and temporal levels at which marine 
resources occur requires multilevel governance. These features are not unique to marine and coastal 
resources; but they are of particular importance to these resources.  
Second, the term ―sustainability‖ has many different meanings requiring that we make our 
understanding transparent. Discussing the different definitions of the term sustainability would be a 
paper or a book on its own [4,5]. For the purpose of this paper, we rely on a narrow understanding of 
sustainability to examine institutional change in the coastal and marine realm as it relates to 
environmental improvement and the mitigation of collective action problems linked to resource use. 
As social scientists we are not attempting to judge ecological sustainability. However, for the sake of 
this paper, we do not need to qualify any empirical situation as being more or less sustainable. 
Third, there are many institutional attempts to reach sustainability in relation to the coastal and 
marine realm. Institutional systems vary from individual transferable quotas (ITQs), to the Kyoto 
protocol, to fishing regulations, to rules for sewage water treatment for the sea. Here we focus 
primarily on institutions related to Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). Given the agreement within the 
Convention of Biological Diversity to increase MPAs globally (from 2.3% to 10% by 2020), and the 
continuous claim that many of the existing MPAs could be considered paper parks [6], the discussion 
of this particular governance option is prominent.  
The paper develops as follows. First, we use the social-ecological system (SES) diagnostic 
framework to characterize marine and coastal systems. Second, derived from the first step, we discuss 
the various drivers of institutional change, and finally we draw conclusions on institutions and 
sustainability in the marine and coastal realm.  
2. Characterizing Marine and Coastal Resources, the SES Framework  
The SES diagnostic framework is a generic framework for analyzing social-ecological systems 
particularly with respect to collective action and institutions for sustainable resource use. Institutions 
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as rules of the game [7] are the interface, regulating what members of the social systems are permitted 
and forbidden to do in relation to the ecological systems and in relation to themselves [8]. There are no 
panaceas for institutional solutions fostering sustainable use of the seas as this depends on the 
characteristics of the ecological system and its respective resources. Additionally, solutions are 
contingent on the characteristics of the corresponding social systems, namely their structures and the 
preferences of the actors involved. In many aspects, marine and coastal social-ecological systems are 
markedly different to other SES. Carving out these differences will improve our understanding of how 
institutions and sustainability might interconnect in the coastal and marine realm. Table 1 shows the 
second tier variables of the SES diagnostic framework. We use various items listed there to explore the 
substantial characteristics of a marine and coastal SES. For this paper we selected the variables we 
realized to be most important during our research on different marine and coastal regions within the 
tropical belt (see [3] for a more comprehensive discussion of the applicability of the SES diagnostic 
framework to a marine environment).  
Table 1. Second-tier variables in framework for analyzing an SES. 
Social, Economic and Political Setting (S) 
S1: Economic development, S2: Demographic trends, S3: Political stability, 
S4: Government settlement policies, S5: Market incentives, S6: Media organization 
Resource system (RS) Governance System (GS) 
RS1: Sector (e.g., water, forests, pasture, fish) GS1: Government organizations 
RS2: Clarity of system boundaries GS2: Non-government organizations 
RS3: Size of resource system GS3: Network structures 
RS4: Human-constructed facilities GS4: Property-rights system 
RS5: Productivity of system GS5: Operational rules 
RS6: Equilibrium properties GS6: Collective-choice rules 
RS7: Predictability of system dynamics GS7: Constitutional rules 
RS8: Storage characteristics GS8: Monitoring and sanctioning processes 
RS9: Location  
Resource Units (RU) Users (U) 
RU1: Resource unit mobility U1: Number of users 
RU2 Growth or replacement rate U2: Socioeconomic attributes of users 
RU3: Inter action among resource units U3: History of use 
RU4: Economic values U4: Locations 
RU5: Size  U5: Leadership/entrepreneurship 
RU6: Distinctive markings U6: Norms/Social capital 
RU7: Spatial and temporal distribution U7: Knowledge of SES/mental models 
 U8: Dependence on resources 
 U9: Technologies used 
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Table 1. Cont. 
Interactions (I) Outcomes (O) 
I1: Harvesting levels of different users O1: Social performances measures 
I2: Information sharing among users O2: Ecological performance measures 
I3: Deliberation processes O3: Externalities to other SESs 
I4: Conflicts among users  
I5: Investment activities  
I6: Lobbying actibities  
Related Ecosystem (ECO) 
ECO1: Climate patterns, ECO2:Pollution patterns, ECO3: Flows into and out if focal SES 
Source: [9]. 
2.1. Social, Economic, and Political Settings (S) 
Looking at economic development (S1), demographic trends (S2) and political stability (S3) of the 
locations where institutional change takes place in relation to MPAs, it is very difficult to generalize. 
Comparing, for example, Costa Rica with Angola, vast differences are evident. Costa Rica competes 
globally for wealthy eco-tourists, has a rather moderate fishing fleet, a low birth rate [10] and political 
stability for the last hundred years. Meanwhile, Angola has difficulty attracting any marine tourists, 
has a low GDP, relies heavily on any form of income from the sea, has an extremely high birth rate [10] 
and would not be graded as a place of political stability. However, what these sites have in common is 
that economic development is dynamic and fish protein is crucial. Coastal populations continue to 
increase rapidly putting greater pressure on the resource. Many tropical coastal states could be 
classified as weak with comparatively low administrative capacity.  
Market incentives (S5) and proximity to markets are important features for sustainability. In the past 
certain MPAs were remote from market incentives; however coastal and marine resource markets are 
increasingly globalized. Examples of this include: the aquaculture fish of Vietnam, which competes 
with the local catch in a beach restaurant in Colombia; or the Costa Rican land market, where the 
fisherman and the farmer compete with the international tourist in a ―for saleo‖ (this is the Costa Rican 
word for a speculative bubble on the land market and stems from the English word ―for sale‖, a sign 
posted at many Costa Rican coastal plots).  
2.2. The Resource System (RS) 
According to Ostrom [11] and other scholars, Clarity of system boundaries (RS2) is necessary to 
create a system of sustainable institutions [12]. If resource users can be sure that they will be able to 
secure any return on investment for themselves (this investment might be a current abstinence of 
resource use for future benefit), the likelihood that people will invent sustainable institutions is much 
higher. This explains why some traditional common property regimes such as the Indonesian sasi laut 
have solely regulated the exploitation of sedentary marine resources (e.g., sea cucumbers, trochus), 
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which occur within comparatively clear boundaries. A similar case is the New England lobster fishery 
(involving a species with little mobility) which is often used as an example of good communal 
governance [13]. The situation is completely different for mobile species and the open sea. Looking, 
for example, at highly migratory species such as tuna, turtles or whales, it becomes clear that system 
boundaries must be understood as either unstable (that the individual systems in which they occur are 
interconnected [14]), or that system boundaries should be set on a very high geographical level.  
The last option creates a number of well-known collective action problems [15]. The ecological 
characteristics responsible for such unclear boundaries in the marine realm also imply high transaction 
costs for all matters of management, including conservation. Excludability is always a matter of degree 
and of the associated transaction costs [16]. Although the oceans are increasingly zoned for different 
purposes, it is difficult to secure these boundaries as we cannot fence the sea. 
Issues of zoning and excludability are of special relevance to MPAs. A number of MPAs have 
failed, with boundaries that are not adequately defined, understood or respected. The underlying 
reasons are many, ranging from insufficient funding, ineffective participation processes and reduced 
legitimacy [17]. MPAs can be undermined by a lack of compliance which is often driven by a shortage 
of livelihood alternatives or eroded trust in governing bodies. Furthermore, local meanings and values 
of the area are not always well considered in management, leading to resistance. While excludability is 
pronounced when looking at marine resources, one can see that the transaction costs for excludability 
vary as technology changes. For example, in Costa Rica all fishing boats will be equipped with a GPS 
transmitter in the future as part of a government led program to address drug trafficking. In theory, this 
could make monitoring of MPA boundaries inexpensive and easy to do even from an office in San 
Jose. In this case, the increased control of the boundaries comes at zero costs as the GPS system is 
implemented mainly for drug traffic control reasons and MPA protection is only a side product. 
Unclearly defined ecological system boundaries also relate to the size of the resource system (RS3). 
Within marine systems, humans primarily extract animal resources; many of which are highly mobile 
species (this might change, e.g., looking to future sea grass use, oil and gas extraction, sea mining and 
site-specific tourism). The productivity (RS5), from a resource extraction point of view (i.e., return per 
square meter), is small compared for example with a forest, a vineyard or Tokyo city center. Because 
there is a cost associated with building institutions; and these transaction costs must somehow be 
carried by the return of the resource; it can be concluded that the size of the required governance 
system for the marine environment will be larger than for other resource systems [18]. This is certainly 
evident when looking at nations within the tropical belt with low budgetary possibilities.  
Today, it is difficult to find ecosystems that are not influenced by humans. Even in marine 
environments humans can be seen as ecosystem engineers [19]. Intentionally, and most of the time 
unintentionally, we change marine ecosystems considerably. Examples include acidification, aquaculture, 
mangrove destruction, and huge wind park installation. However, in comparison to land-based resources, 
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the architectural role of humans (in terms of producing and providing the ecosystem), is rather small. 
Forests, landscapes, irrigation channels, or alms are the result of human action, provision and 
investment [14]. As such these are examples of cultural landscapes. In this respect the sea is different: 
human beings use marine resources (appropriating) but do not provide them [20]. For example, animal 
breeding has many thousand years of history while large scale aquaculture is a more recent development.  
The likelihood of successfully regulating a SES increases with greater understanding and 
predictability (predictability of system dynamics (RS7)). If we compare our knowledge and 
understanding of marine and coastal systems with other ecosystems, it seems clear that the level of 
knowledge and predictability is much lower for the first. Due to the high mobility of many of the 
resources, the marine ecosystem is characterized by interdependencies, which in turn lead to a complex 
system with many uncertainties. This relates to the equilibrium properties (RS6) of the marine 
ecological system. Often these equilibrium properties are not known. 
2.3. Resource Units (RU) 
As mentioned above, humans have primarily used the mobile resource (RU1) of fish. Additionally, 
it is difficult to establish distinctive markings (RU6) in the sea. Ostrom emphasizes the importance of 
distinctive markings when describing successful collective cattle ranging and associated land use [11]. 
The growth or replacement rate (RU2) of the resources used varies substantially. For example, an 
herbivore fish stock might regenerate rather quickly. Meanwhile, a coral reef, seagrass bed or 
mangrove forest might take decades or centuries after they have faced substantial damage. This is 
coupled with a highly interdependent system with significant interaction among resource units (RU3). 
Within the context of an interdependent system, where the market is globalized but production takes 
place in localized ecosystems, the economic value of many marine resources does not reflect scarcity 
within the particular social-ecological system due to high discrepancies in purchasing power. For 
example, the price of sea cucumber on the international market is so high that it pays for a Colombian 
fisher to invest many weeks to find the few left in his ecosystem.  
All the characteristics described so far seem to make it more difficult to build sustainable 
institutions for the sea. However, if we look at the spatial and temporal distribution (RU7) of the 
resource unit, combined with the human uncontrollability of the sea, we might find higher resilience 
among specific marine resources in comparison to land based resources [14]. Today, it is relatively 
easy for us to hunt the last tiger, but it may be more difficult to find the last turtle in the sea (this could 
change with ultrasound technology). This relates back to equilibrium properties and predictability of 
the system (RS6 and RS7). The resilience of the system may be higher, but this also means that the 
fluctuations of the ecosystems are greater, leading to increased difficulty in reaching a sustainable 
institutional system. As an example, think of fish stocks during ―el Niño y la Niña‖ events in the 
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upwelling system of the Eastern Tropical Pacific where a very flexible and responsive institutional 
system is necessary for reaching sustainable exploitation. 
2.4. Governance System (GS) 
Societies and ecosystems interact on and across various spatial, temporal and a range of other  
levels [21]. Dimensions at which ecological phenomena appear often do not coincide with the 
institutional levels at which management decisions are made. This leads to mismatches, also known as 
―the problem of fit‖ [22,23]. For example, while a lobster fishery might be regulated most effectively 
at the level of a small bay, sustainable governance for sea turtles implies coordination among several 
countries across a region. Management of whale populations would need cross-continental 
cooperation. Looking at ocean acidification, a global governance mechanism seems the only useful 
way to offer feasible governance. Given the diversity of marine ecosystems and acknowledging that 
human requirements are also different between sites, regulation must simultaneously occur at various 
social levels (e.g., villages, countries or even continents) [24]. This makes it extremely difficult to 
govern in a centralized way, with per se rules which do not incorporate place-specific knowledge and 
conditions. Ecosystem diversity and the specific social and ecological contexts require polycentric,  
de-centralized, emerging governance systems [25]. In most cases, sustainable institutions for the sea 
must be multi-level and nested governance systems [17,26,27].  
Comparatively, formal governance and institutions are slow to emerge or are still lacking for the sea. 
For instance, spatial planning is well established for land based resources, but is just beginning to develop 
for the sea. This is particularly true for the open ocean, but is relevant for the coast as well, where MPA 
implementation lags substantially behind terrestrial areas. Even if there are examples of successful 
governance, many property rights systems (GS4) are undeveloped leading to de facto open access.  
Lack of working governance systems also means that the administrative capacity of and knowledge 
about governing the sea is limited in comparison to other resources. Currently, many highly valued 
marine and coastal resources are situated in tropical regions (which often correlate with weaker 
governance abilities of the state (GS1)), emphasizing the reality that substantial barriers exist toward 
reaching a sustainable institutional system. In the past, when several state institutions emerged to 
govern non-sea related ecosystems (only recently have traditional rights been granted to stakeholders), 
there did not exist many environmental non-governmental organizations (GS2). This is markedly 
different in the current process of institution building, where NGOs are central stakeholders in the 
process of emerging institutions.  
2.5. Users (U) 
It is difficult to generically characterize users of marine and coastal ecosystems. Somehow, the 
entire world population could be seen as ecosystem users to a smaller or larger degree. For example, 
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when considering the ocean as a carbon sink, the number of users (U1 on Table1) would then be seven 
billion. We focus here on tropical marine ecosystem users which are at the center of our research interest.  
The socioeconomic attributes of users (U2) vary substantially. On one side of the spectrum, there 
are the economically (extremely) vulnerable artisanal fishers whose livelihoods depend heavily on 
fishing (U8). In some cases, open access fishing rights have social security functions providing a 
minimum protein source for the most vulnerable [28]. On the other hand of the spectrum, one might 
find, for example, rich foreign property owners who hold a significant portion of the land on the Costa 
Rican Pacific Coast, and who want to use the coast to develop marinas or to snorkel without being 
disturbed by bomb fishers or the smell from fish landings. In between, one finds tourism operators of 
different sizes, national and international fishing fleets and inhabitants of coastal zones who need the 
sea and the coast for multiple uses, e.g., as a means of transportation, sewage disposal, or as a buffer to 
protect their lives and property. Last but not least, stakeholders such as marine scientists and 
conservationists rely directly on marine ecosystems for their livelihood.  
Apart from the socioeconomic differences, marine ecosystem users contrast in other respects. 
Norms and social capital (U6) vary, for example, between autochthonous users: displaced  
people searching for a livelihood, all-inclusive tourists, international hotel chains, and  
sometimes-more-sometimes-less corrupt governments. It is not uncommon to find all those different 
stakeholders in one place, attempting to use a bay simultaneously. The diversity in resource users only 
compounds the limited understanding of the resource system. Under such circumstances, where 
informational feedback loops of the system are not always conclusive, it is very likely that different 
mental models (U7) and ideologies explaining how the ecosystem functions persist [29–31]. 
Furthermore, varying explanations might contradict each other. Those contradictions are already 
obvious within the scientific community [32], but are also relevant when we consider the various 
conflicts between conservationists and ecosystem users. These conflicts cannot be fully explained by 
differences in interest, but also by different understandings of the systems.  
The technology used (U9) by ecosystem users is varied. We take as an example different fishing 
techniques. They can range from cyanide, bomb fishing and compressor diving, to turtle excluder 
devices, ultrasound fishing fleets, or the recreational fishing rod at the end of a cruising yacht. Looking 
to other sectors would likely reveal a similar diversity.  
Obviously, the differences in economic status, technology, knowledge, and so on, do not always 
lead to generalized conflicts of interest. However, if we want to understand institutional change in the 
coastal and marine realm, heterogeneity [33,34] and power asymmetries [35,36] of interest groups 
must be considered. For example, Jentoft [37] describes the substantial conflict of interests between 
foreign island owners and Miskitos on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua. In this case, indigenous people 
have tried to use MPAs as a tool to reduce foreign land owner rights, and to secure their traditional 
rights. Often we find the other constellation, in which the tourism industry or powerful property 
owners use MPAs to improve the value of their properties by excluding poor fishers.  
2.6. Interactions (I) 
Within the diverse groups of ecosystem users, we have considerably different harvesting levels (I1). 
This creates problems among users as well as in the scope of management. Often small-scale artisanal 
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fishers clash with the more technology intensive fishers when their fishing groups overlap. Within the 
tourism sector, there also exists conflict among big foreign development and small locally based industries.  
2.7. Outcomes (O) and Related Ecosystems (ECO) 
The social performance measures (O1) are the same as for other common pool resources; however, 
the ecological performance measures (O2) are of particular difficulty for coastal and marine resources. 
It is more difficult to observe fish abundance, the state of coral reefs, or a sea grass bed than the health 
of a forest. Externalities to other SESs (O3 and ECO) are of central importance. The concept of static 
externalities is not able to capture the level of interdependence among different systems [38].  
Those interdependencies are often complex and difficult to observe as they exist on a medium to long 
term basis. Taking a coral reef system as an example, a higher nitrogen intake due to land use changes 
may not be noticed for several decades before the negative externalities for the reef are observed.  
In other scenarios, interdependencies exist on a large geographical level (e.g., the CO2 emitted in 
localized industrial centers negatively affect reefs globally). In the following section, we reflect on 
those characteristics of the social-ecological system for analyzing which drivers of institutional change 
might be especially relevant for the marine realm.  
3. Drivers of Institutional Change for the Marine Realm 
There are many theories of institutional change and it is not in the scope of this paper to deliver any 
comprehensive review of the different approaches (for this see [39–41]). Starting from a conventional 
economic perspective, as held by the early new institutional economists (see for example [42]), 
institutional change was seen as mainly driven by shifting scarcities and preferences. Via a fuzzy 
competition process in the market [43], the society [44] or the political sphere [45], new institutions 
emerged. If we consider the history of the emergence of environmental institutions, we realize that 
there is certainly some explanatory power of this theory. Once, when there was an abundance of land, 
institutions for land rights did not exist. Similarly, when there was an abundance of beavers or air, 
there were no institutions existing for the regulation of those resources. As scarcity grew, and 
preferences changed for those goods, institutions began to develop.  
There exists a duality regarding marine resources: on one hand, the intense use pressure for protein, 
tourism and shipping development. On the other hand, the desire to protect resources is extremely 
high. This illustrates the current move toward institutional change in the marine sector. Scholars of this 
approach praise the ability of competitive pressures to lead to better (in the sense of better serving 
human kind) institutions. Certainly, there is greater competition within institutional development and 
also within the associated markets (e.g., the fish or tourism market). Bromley [46] makes the point that 
this competition does not work in relation to institutions of sustainability. Future generations cannot 
defend their interests in a competitive process. Such a pessimistic interpretation only holds true if we 
believe that our preferences are mainly determined by self-interest and not also by altruism (e.g., 
toward future generations). For example, this does not reflect climate change policies as current 
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generations will most likely not experience any consequences of those institutional changes.  
In addition, power asymmetries between different stakeholders underscore the question, exactly who 
among the current generation benefits from certain institutional changes [47]? 
Even if shifting scarcities and preferences are often a cause for institutional change, they cannot 
determine which institutional solutions are finally selected. For that, institutional economics theory 
provides four different avenues of explanation: relative transaction costs, path dependencies, ideology 
and power.  
3.1. Transaction Costs 
High (transaction) costs (which also correspond to minimal extraction, such as with deep sea 
resources) have been an important reason why property rights in many areas of marine resource use 
did not emerge earlier. In many cases, owning a tree or a plot of land is relatively straight forward, but 
fencing part of the ocean is extremely difficult. One might be able to demarcate a particular area in the 
sea (e.g., a coral reef); nevertheless, this will not prevent some resources from moving in and out of that 
area. It is this combination of low production per square meter of sea with high transaction costs 
associated with exclusive property rights which can lead to an open access regime. In the past, the price 
of a fence in many rangeland areas hindered the establishment of individual rights; however it still 
remains low in comparison to the required costs to create private rights in most parts of the sea. 
Varying (transaction) costs due to technological change (e.g., the invention of GPS trackers in MPAs as 
mentioned above, innovation of ITQs or of mobile phones for coordination purposes among fishers), 
have also influenced sustainability and institutional change in exploiting marine resources. Specific 
orders from Hong Kong for live fish are now easily and quickly transferred—via traders and patrons—to 
Indonesian fishers, who then have lower transaction costs to find out which species are in demand.  
3.2. Path Dependencies  
Institutional path dependencies mean that institutions governing a situation today are a result of the 
institutions which previously governed the system. If a society has a strong tradition in common 
property regimes or participation, it is likely that new institutional solutions will be similar to the 
existing ones. Institutional path dependencies could result out of lower set up costs for an existing 
regime. They also result from network effects among institutions. Often, an institution requires an 
entire network of fitting institutions to work [48]. Current institutions can limit imagination as well, 
defining what is considered to be feasible institutional solutions.  
Path dependencies seem to play a role in institutional change particularly in relation to marine 
sustainability. Historically, it is a customary right that marine resources are open access and free to  
all [15,49,50]. We may accept that we are not allowed to enter a privately owned meadow, but it might 
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seem strange to us if a fisher prohibited us from swimming in the sea on our Caribbean cruise.  
That said, in what context would fishers be allowed to fish in areas frequented by recreational tourists? 
Perhaps more important are those path dependencies related to protected area management. As 
indicated above, we have relatively little experience in governing the sea in comparison to other 
ecosystems. The institutional framework for MPAs has clearly been taken from the blueprint of land 
based protected areas [50]. However, as shown above, there are substantial differences in the 
characteristics of land and sea based social-ecological systems. To neglect those differences might 
endanger ecological, social and economic sustainability of the governance framework [14]. Those path 
dependencies might not only result from the fact that laws for land based protection have been copied, 
but also informal institutions. For example, how a government official or scientist approaches people 
using the ecosystem, or how he or she involves them in the process of institutional change might lead 
to social unsustainability (for example through the erosion of trust [51]). There is a fluid link among 
those informal institutions which determine the process of change and the next determinant, ideology. 
Informal institutions are often a reflection of ideologies, mental models and an individual’s 
understandings of their system.  
3.3. Ideology 
As described above and pointed out by Denzau and North [29], institutional change in systems 
characterized by uncertainties, and thus with unclear feedback loops, leads to a strong influence of 
mental models (how humans explain the observed reality) and ideology. The goals of MPAs and 
drivers of institutional change are manifold. Objectives include scientific research, environmental 
services, sustainable resource use, environmental education, tourism, and cultural heritage [52].  
In response to the 1992 signing of the Convention on Biological Diversity, biodiversity conservation 
also emerged as a central goal of MPAs [53]. The increased emphasis on biodiversity included 
additional financial and institutional support for research on the biological effects of MPA design and 
implementation. Resource management policy has also shifted from single species protection to a 
broad-scale ecosystem approach to management. 
Within the academic literature about MPAs, one can distinguish several ―ideological‖ streams [50]. 
Historically, there has been a shift in protected area management from a ―fortress approach,‖ (state 
mandated restricted preservation areas in which no extractive activity is allowed), toward increased 
stakeholder participation, multiple use zoning, and decentralized management [54]. The ―early birds‖ 
of marine protection frequently emerged from the natural sciences, emphasizing a preservationist 
perspective. Protectionist approaches sought to gazette off areas of land and sea for the purpose of 
limited and specific uses, often excluding traditional users and residents for the benefit of an elite few. 
The main aim was the protection of certain species and ―pristine‖ environment via restricted or 
prohibited use. This led to a rather top down view, which underemphasized the point: in today’s 
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crowded world, the sea is also part of the human environment. Often a complete ban of resource use 
led to severe conflicts, sometimes for the most vulnerable members of society. The method of enforced 
exclusion from land and sea also led to community protest and resistance. Resistance to protected area 
policy takes many forms, but can result in high management costs and low compliance. In the last 
decade, social wellbeing has been incorporated into resource management policies in an effort to 
increase compliance.  
In contrast to early protected area plans, a more bottom up approach developed, which highlights 
the need for grassroot participation for sustainable institutional change [55]. Proponents suggest that 
co-management and the devolution of authority lead to a greater investment in sustainable institutions. 
Co-management gained in popularity becoming a dominant strategy for conservation projects and 
specifically for common pool resource management. Co-management emerged after conventional,  
top-down protected area conservation tactics often failed to achieve conservation goals, while further 
marginalizing local residents [56]. Rampant non-compliance of conservation regulations coupled with 
a growing awareness about social injustices led to new and innovative conservation strategies.  
Far from a one-size-fits-all solution, co-management schemes tend to work better under specific scalar 
and institutional conditions [57,58]. Generally, participation focuses heavily on the inclusion of 
interested and affected parties. Just how relevant users are identified and integrated into the planning 
system remains a challenge and open to much critique.  
Studying the literature streams, it becomes clear that, due to the complexity of the issue, we cannot 
be certain what drives sustainable institutional change in this sector. Scientific perspectives might 
often conflict with the understandings of actual resource users [59]. Furthermore, they play an 
important role in feeding the policy debate on conservation targets [60] and highlight the role of power 
within resource management and sustainability. 
3.4. Power 
Power asymmetries between actors have been described by Knight [36] as a determinant of 
institutional change. Considering the heterogeneities described in section 2.5 about the various users, 
we realize that power asymmetries also play an important role in understanding institutional change 
and sustainability for the sea [24]. Local actors are involved in social networks and hierarchies which 
determine their positions within a society [61]. As a result, their ability to voice and negotiate their 
interests diverges considerably [62,63]. Clearly, members of social elites with strong networks, greater 
access to knowledge and sufficient financial resources are far more able to stand up for their interests 
and to make decisions. In Indonesian fishing communities, dependent fishers (clients) might not even 
raise their voice in the presence of their patron. Economically and socially dependent, they live in a 
situation where they have very little freedom of choice. In many countries, access to knowledge and 
institutional decision making is influenced by race, gender, class, and language. Social elites can have 
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a very strong influence on institutional changes. Adhuri [64] has reported a case from Maluku 
(Indonesia) where community leaders provided the traditional exclusive fishing rights to a fishing 
company using destructive methods. In return, they received political support and could further 
strengthen their own social positioning.  
4. Conclusions 
Despite the vast diversity of coastal and marine resources, they nevertheless share characteristics 
that can be applied to the whole marine and coastal realm, and that define the institutional change in 
this area. This includes unclear boundaries, the interconnectedness of different ecosystems, high 
uncertainty due to limited knowledge and the related need for multilevel governance. Ecological 
characteristics are significant, clearly illustrating the need for a joint perspective of the natural and 
social sciences. Due to the complexity of marine and coastal systems, there is no single theory or 
discipline that is able to describe institutional change in the marine and coastal realm. 
From this perspective, the SES framework provides an open approach able to integrate different 
theories [9]. Additionally, the framework is not deterministic, as this would be an injustice to the 
complexity and unpredictability of the systems analyzed. Marine and coastal social-ecological systems 
are so diverse that it would not be possible to adapt the SES diagnostic framework to all systems. 
Adapting the third or fourth tier would be considerably different depending on the resource analyzed. 
Take, for example, turtle egg harvesters [3,51] verses whale watching tourism operators [65].  
Within the field of natural resource use, the SES diagnostic framework incorporates the accrued 
research on collective action in such diverse fields as forestry, irrigation, agriculture or marine 
resources [12]. From this perspective, applying the SES framework nevertheless reduces the chance of 
missing certain aspects of the collective action process. In various analyses, using the SES diagnostic 
frameworks’ variables showed little relevance after more detailed knowledge of the particular case. 
However, having these variables in the toolbox when approaching the case ensured nothing was 
overlooked. By comparing collective action in relation to different ecosystems used [54], we can 
further enhance our understanding of collective action in general but also in a particular field. To 
compare different ecosystems or cases we need a common generic framework which then enables a 
comparative assessment [12,55].  
Due to the complexity and uncertainty within the marine realm, institutional change is more heavily 
influenced by different ideologies within certain sectors. There are some common characteristics to 
marine and coastal ecosystems; however, no one institutional solution exists that can act as a panacea 
to fit all coastal marine ecosystems. Moreover, polycentric and multi-level institutional solutions are 
required for doing justice to those diverse social-ecological systems.  
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